Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) is a mechanism that facilitates search over encrypted data that is outsourced to an untrusted Server. SSE schemes offer practicality at the expense of some information leakage.
INTRODUCTION
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) was introduced in 2000 by Song et al. ([35] ) as a new approach to facilitate search over encrypted documents (database records or files) which are hosted in an untrusted server. The problem of securely querying encrypted data has been extensively studied and there are several secure techniques, like multiparty computation schemes ( [19] ), Oblivious RAM (ORAM) algorithms ( [21] ), or fully homomorphic encryption ( [18] ). However, all these solutions do not scale.
The SSE schemes aim to balance between efficiency and security. They offer practicality at the expense of provable information leakage. What the security proof guarantees is that there is a well defined upper bound of the information leaked. In [12] , Curtmola et al. proposed the modern security definition of SSE. In the state of the art schemes, that attacker can choose new queries after receiving the server's response to previous ones (adaptive security), and the proof is based on the simulation paradigm.
A dynamic SSE (DSSE) scheme supports updates. The first efficient DSSE schemes were presented in [25] and [26] . Designing secure DSEE schemes is a challenging task as the update operation is an additional source of information leakage. Two security notions have been defined related to DSSE security, forward and backward privacy. Informally, a scheme offers forward privacy when the addition operation doesn't leak any information regarding the added document and its keywords. A backward private DSSE is the one that doesn't leak any information regarding the documents that have been added and deleted between two keyword searches. Forward privacy was introduced in [10] , while backward privacy was introduced in [37] and formally defined in [2] . Recently, the attack model has been extended to include malicious servers and not only honest-but-curious ones ( [4] ).
The vast majority of the schemes support only single keyword queries. Some SSE proposals focused on more expressive queries, like conjunctive queries, wildcards, and substring [6, 13, 16, 23, 24, 29, 39] , multiuser settings [33, 34] , or the combination of SSE with ORAM [31, 32] . Some schemes offer performance optimization, like [1, 7, 14, 30] . The notion of SSE has also been generalized in [11] as structured encryption.
Recently, the SSE's information leakage has been exploited and several attacks have been proposed ( [8, 41] ). These attacks have demonstrated that forward privacy is a necessary property for DSSE schemes. Several efficient dynamic SSE schemes with forward privacy have been proposed [3, 5, 15, 17, 22, 27, 28, 31, 36, 37] . However, none of these schemes offered backward privacy. The last two years, some efficient both backward and forward private schemes have been introduced.
In this paper, we introduce a new efficient scheme that offers forward privacy and the highest defined level of backward privacy with constant and small number of roundtrips. The scheme hides the memory accesses. We evaluate the scheme's performance and we demonstrate that it is practical.
Our Contribution
We introduce a new DSSE scheme, namely Mara, that offers both forward and backward privacy. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the most efficient one that achieves this level of security with constant number of roundtrips (at most four messages are exchanged).
In more details, the proposed scheme (1) offers forward privacy.
(2) offers the highest defined level of backward privacy.
(3) is provably secure. We assume that the Server is honestbut -curious. That is that, the Server explores the leaked information, but executes the algorithms properly. (4) achieves privacy with constant number of roundtrips (at most four messages are exchanged). (5) has very good asymptotic complexity. (6) is practical. We have implemented the proposed scheme and we have evaluated its performance. (7) is dynamic and supports document addition and deletion as well as the document/keyword pair updates.
Our scheme, Mara, uses two data structures to maintain the search index, an oblivious data structure and an encrypted multimap (EMM). Every document has an index ind and for every keyword ω that it contains, a pair (ind, ω) is stored in the search index. The search index is outsourced encrypted to the Server and it is used to support single keyword queries, i.e. to return the document indices ind that contain a given keyword ω. We elaborate a little bit on the rationale behind our design choices.
By definition, a backward private scheme leaks the document identifiers to the Server, when a keyword is searched. It is called access pattern and this type of leakage is considered acceptable as part of the trade off between security and practicality.
This leakage implies a natural division of the encrypted search index into two parts. The first part contains the access pattern, i.e. the document identifiers that have been leaked to the Server, as part of a keyword search operation. A multi-map is used to store this information. Given that the Server already knows the identifiers, the multi-map is managed by the Server. However, it is stored encrypted to protect it from the outsiders. This design choice improves drastically the search efficiency as the leaked information will be used again in subsequent queries on the same keyword. The Server will be able to retrieve part of the queries reply very efficiently. The same idea was previously used by Hahn and Kerschbaum in [22] .
The second part of the encrypted index contains the updates that have not been yet used in a keyword search, i.e. it is still only known to the Client. Thus, this part is stored using an ORAM like algorithm and it is managed by the Client.
Most ORAM algorithms are rather impractical and very interactive. However, in our scheme, we are able to introduce another improvement. By design, the data blocks are inserted once in the oblivious data structure (when the update takes place) and they are extracted once (when a keyword search takes place). We take advantage of this insert/extract once requirement and we are using a very simple and efficient oblivious data structure. It is called SORAM and it is a simplified version of Path-ORAM. The use of SORAM enables us to limit the number of communication roundtrips. The number of exchanged messages is constant and at most four.
Mara has security proof in the simulation paradigm and it is practical. We have implemented the scheme to evaluate its performance.
Related Work
In [2] , the first four efficient forward and backward private SSE schemes were introduced. Namely, Moneta, Fides, Diana del and Janus. A year later, in [9] , three more schemes were proposed, Mitra, Orion and Horus, while in [40] Janus + + was introduced,
as an improved version of Janus. The schemes can be divided into two categories, based on their components. The first category contains the DSSE schemes that are using some kind of oblivious data structure. Namely, Moneta, Orion and Horus. Moneta, uses an ORAM algorithm called TW ORAM ( [17] ) that minimizes the number of roundtrips, while Orion and Horus use oblivious maps as their main data structure.
The second category contains all the other schemes, namely Fides, Diana del , Janus and Janus + +. Fides makes black box use of another DSSE scheme, called Σoϕoς ( [3] ). Diana del is a two roundtrips protocol that is using a range constrained PRF , and, finally, Janus and its successor Janus + +, are using puncturable encryption schemes and forward-secure searchable encryption instances.
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS 2.1 Notation
In Table 1 , we summarize the notation used. Let λ be the security parameter and let neдl(λ) be a negligible function in λ. We use |X| to denote the cardinality of the set X and x ← f (y) the output x of the function f .
A document consists of a distinct document index ind i and a set of keywords W i , matching the document. The document indices and the keywords are represented by λ-bit strings. A database DB is defined as
Let W be the set of all keywords and N the number of all document/keyword pairs. The number of updates, both additions and deletions, for a keyword ω is a ω and the number of updates since the last search for ω is a The number of pairs added/deleted in a batch Search(σ , q; EDB, CC): It is an algorithm between the Client and the Server. The Client using its internal state σ prepares a search token for the query q. Since, our scheme supports only single keyword searches, only the keyword ω is needed as input. The Server uses the encrypted database EDB and the token to locate the corresponding subset of encrypted documents from collection CC. The Server sends the document ciphertexts to the Client and the Client decrypts them.
Update(σ , type, Data; EDB, CC): It is an algorithm between the Client and the Server. It supports two operations, addition and deletion, and two types of data, document and DB entries. That is that, it can either add/remove a document, or it can add/remove a set of document/keyword pairs of existing documents. In the first case, when a new document is added, Data contains the type of operation, the document and the corresponding index ind. The Client encrypts the document and the Server stores the document's ciphertext in the ciphertext collection CC associated with the label ind. When the document is deleted, the Server also deletes the ciphertext from CC. In the second case, Data contains a set of pairs and for each pair, the operation that must be performed. The Client prepares the addition/deletion token using the local state σ and the Server updates the EDB.
A DSSE scheme is said to be correct, if the search protocol returns the correct result for every query, except with negligible probability.
Security definitions
A leakage function is used to express the information that is leaked by every DSSE operation. The leakage function is stateful and it is divided into three components, L = (L Stp , L Sr ch , L U pdt ) that correspond, respectively, to the three operations, setup, search, and update.
The security of a DSSE scheme Σ is defined using a real-world versus ideal-world formalization [12] . The attacker must distinguish between a real world (Real) and an ideal world (Ideal). The attacker can trigger and parametrize any operation at will, she is able to observe the full content of the communication between Client and Server and she can see the Server's memory. In the Ideal world, simulated transcript is used in place of the real transcript generated by a PPT algorithm S, the simulator, that has access to the leakage functions, while in the Real world, the attacker sees the real transcript of each operation. At the end the attacker outputs a bit b. The scheme Σ is secure, if the two worlds are indistinguishable.
Our definition follows the definition of [37] . Definition 2.1. [37] (Adaptive security of DSSE schemes). An DSSE scheme Σ is L-adaptively secure, with respect to a leakage function L, if for any polynomial-time adversary A issuing a polynomial number of queries q(λ), there exists a PPT simulator S such that:
The two games Real Σ A and Ideal Σ A,S,L appear in the Appendix A.
Forward and Backward Privacy. Informally, a DSSE scheme is forward private when the update queries do not leak any information about the involved keywords, and it is backward-private when the search queries do not reveal any information regarding deleted documents. That is that, if a document/keyword pair (ind, ω) is added and deleted before a Search query on ω, then the subsequent search queries on ω must not reveal ind. From the two definitions, the following theorem derives easily. Theorem 2.2. If a DSSE scheme is not forward private, then it is not backward private.
In [2] , three flavors of backward privacy are defined of decreasing strength, depending on how much information is leaked. More precisely,
(1) Type-I: Backward privacy with insertion pattern leaks the documents currently matching the keyword ω, when they were inserted, and the total number of updates on ω.
(2) Type-II: Backward privacy with update pattern leaks the documents currently matching the keyword ω, when they were inserted, and when all the updates on ω happened (but not their content). (3) Type-III:Weak backward privacy leaks the documents currently matching the keyword ω, when they were inserted, when all the updates on ω happened, and which deletion update canceled which insertion update.
Leakage Functions and Formal Definitions. The leakage function L records the list Q of all queries. The entry is either (u, ω), for every search query, or (u, op, data) for every update query, where u is the timestamp (an index starting at 0 and increasing with every query), ω is the searched keyword, op is the add or delete operation and data is the input. We also define 
is the list of all timestamp and document identifier pairs of ω that have been added to DB and that have not been deleted. The U pdates(ω) is the list of the timestamps of all insertions and deletions for a given keyword ω that appear in Q, while DelHist(ω) returns pairs of timestamps (insertion, corresponding deletion) of the deleted entries of ω.
The search pattern is the most common type of leakage. It is defined as
i.e. it leaks the timestamps of the search queries related to the same keyword ω. The other common type of leakage is the access pattern, i.e. the document indices DB(ω). T imeDB(ω) is the access pattern along with the corresponding addition timestamps. Finally, regarding the forward and backward privacy definitions, from [2] we have that:
[2] (Forward Privacy). A L-adaptively secure DSSE scheme is forward-private if and only if, the update leakage function L U pdt can be written as:
where the function L ′ is stateless. where the functions L ′ and L ′′ are stateless.
Data Structures
We make use of simple data structures, like dictionaries, multi-maps and binary trees. A dictionary Dx of capacity M is a collection of M label/value pairs and supports the Get and Put operations. We write v ← Dx[w] to denote getting the value associated with label ω and Dx[ω] ← v to denote the Put operation that associates the value v in Dx with label ω.
A multi-map MM maps labels to tuples of values, i.e. a multi-map MM is a collection of label/tuple pairs that supports two operations.
We denote by MM[ω] ← V the operation of associating tuple V to label ω and by V ← MM[ω] getting tuple V associated with the label ω (the tuple is removed from the multi-map).
A full binary tree BT of height h has 2 h+1 − 1 nodes N (i, j) , where i ∈ [0, · · · , h] is the level of the tree that the node belongs and j ∈ [0, · · · , 2 i − 1]. For instance, a tree of height h = 2 has the 2 3 − 1 nodes, N (0,0) , N (1, 0) , N (1, 1) , N (2, 0) , N (2, 1) , N (2, 3) and N (2, 4) . Each node is a bucket that stores ns items.
Our binary tree data structure supports four operations. The setup operation that creates a full binary tree BT of height h, BT ← BT .setup(h).
The operation
extracts, from the tree BT , all the nodes N (i, j) , where the index (i, j) belongs in the set J. For instance, for J = {(1, 1), (2, 3)}, the operation returns two nodes, N (1, 1) and N (2, 3) . The operation
writes the nodes in the tree BT , replacing their previous content and, finally, the operation
extracts the unique nodes from n randomly selected tree paths.
Cryptographic Primitives
We use a semantically secure secret-key encryption scheme SKE = (дen, enc, dec), where дen is the key generation process, enc is the probabilistic encryption algorithm and dec the deterministic decryption algorithm. We also make use of a pseudorandom function (PRF) H , i.e. a polynomial-time function that cannot be efficiently distinguished from random functions (by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm). We used keyed-PRF to select paths from the tree. The multi-map MM is stored and queried encrypted using a multi-map encryption scheme Σ M M = (setup, дet, put). The setup initiates the encrypted multi-map EMM and returns a secret key k mm . The дet operation is used for getting the tuple associated to the label ω (the tuple is removed from the multi-map) and the put operation that associates a tuple to a label ω.
Finally, we use an oblivious data strucutre ( [20] ) to hide the outsourced memory access pattern, i.e. the type and the content of the sequence of operations that are performed on memory positions hosted by the Server. We propose SORAM which is a simplified version of Path-ORAM [38] . The data blocks are stored in a full binary tree and the nodes of the tree are data block buckets (they can store up to ns blocks). Each data block is related to a tree path and it can be found in one of the path's nodes. In SORAM, the tree path is computed using a keyed pseudo-random function, as it builds on a design restriction. Each data block is added and removed from the structure, only once. We elaborate on the algorithm in Section 3.3.
MARA DSSE SCHEME 3.1 Design
By reading more carefully the three backward privacy definitions, it is easy to observe that all three of them make the assumption. That a backward private DSSE scheme leaks TimeDB(ω), i.e. the search operation leaks to the Server the document indices DB(ω), as well as, the corresponding time of addition. Our DSSE scheme, Mara, builds on this observation and takes advantage of the leakage to significantly improve search efficiency.
More precisely, we maintain at the Server two data structures. An oblivious data structure, SORAM, that it is managed by the Session: Privacy CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom Client and an encrypted multi-map EMM that it is managed by the Server. All the updates are stored in the SORAM structure and all the leaked document indices in the multi-map.
When the Client wants to add (op = 1) or delete (op = 0) a pair (ind, ω), a triplet (ind ||ω ||op) is stored obliviously in the SORAM structure. All these triplets remain there until the next search for ω.
After a query on ω, all the (leaked) document indices DB(ω) are stored in an encrypted multi-map EMM, associated with the label ω. The multi-map is managed locally and efficiently by the Server and it is stored encrypted to protect the indices from the outsiders.
Thus, both data structures, the SORAM and the EMM, must be used to compute a query on ω. The Client uses the SORAM algorithm to read the update triplets that have been added since the last search for ω. Some of them correspond to new documents (set of indices I 1 ), some of them correspond to old documents that were deleted (set of indices I 0 ) and some of them correspond to documents that were added and deleted between the last and the current query on ω, and must mot be leaked to the Server (backward privacy). Then, the Client sends the sets I 0 and I 1 to the Server and the Server updates locally and efficiently the entry EMM[ω] by adding I 1 and deleting I 0 . In other words, EMM[ω] equals the latest computed DB(ω) (without the updates that take place after the last query on ω).
All the triplets are inserted in the SORAM by the Client, one time and are deleted from the ORAM one time (when we search for ω). Based on this read/write once restriction, the proposed SORAM algorithm is very efficient. It can be seen as a simplified version of PATH-ORAM algorithm [38] . The algorithm inserts data blocks in a full binary tree in one of the nodes of a tree path pth. Each data block is of the form (ind ||ω ||op||pth). We present details of our SORAM algorithm in Section 3.3.
The Client also maintains two counters per keyword, cnt upd . The first one is the total number of searches for ω and the second is the number of updates, related to ω, since the last query on ω. Every time the Client searches for ω, the value of cnt (ω) sr ch increases by one and the counter cnt (ω) upd is set to zero. Both values are used to locate a triplet of ω in the SORAM structure, i.e. the tree path. The tree path is selected using a pseudorandom function given by
where k (ω) is ω's current token given by
where k h is the PRF 's secret key.
The two counters cnt upd . Finally, the Server stores the collection CC of document ciphertexts. A ciphertext is stored in the collection associated with the label ind, each time a new document is added, and it is removed, when the corresponding document is deleted. The Client encrypts the documents using the SKE scheme. The main component of Mara appears in Fig. 1 .
Improvements. If we want to minimize the Client's storage there is a storage/communication complexity trade-off. We can outsource the Client's memory using an ORAM algorithm at the expense of more communication and polylogarithmic number of roundtrips. We can avoid the roundtrips if we use the TWORAM algorithm [17] . However, new garbled circuits must be used with every ORAM access.
The initialization, as well as, the document addition operation, leak, from the ciphertext, the size of each document. A common practice for more security is padding. Of course, such a design choice will increase the storage and communication cost. We omit the details of storage management and we focus on the DSSE structure. 
The algorithms
In Figures 2-4 , we see Mara's algorithms, setup, search and update.
Setup. Let λ be the security parameter, and N the expected number of document/keyword pairs in the system. At the setup phase, the Client setups the SORAM algorithm, and computes the binary tree BT and the secret key k SO used to encrypt the tree nodes. Also, the Client initializes a dictionary D x of capacity |W| and sets all the entries equal to zero, i.e. the two counters per keyword. Finally, the Client computes the SKE secret key k, and the PRF key k h , stores locally all the secret keys and the dictionary D x , and sends BT to the Server.
The Server initializes an encrypted multi-map EMM and stores locally its secret key k mm . Also, the Server stores the binary tree BT and initializes the ciphertexts storage CC.
Keyword search. The Client interacts with the Server and extracts with SORAM the set S of all the data blocks the contain ω. The Client sends the set S and the token t ω for the keyword ω to the Server. The token t ω is a pseudonym for ω and it is used in S to replace ω. Also, it increases by one the counter D x [ω][0] of queries on ω and resets the number of updates D x [ω] [1] to zero. The Server computes from S two disjoint data block subsets I 0 and I 1 , based on the value of op. The set I 1 contains the indices of the documents that contain ω, that were added after the last search for ω and remain in the system, while I 0 contains the indices of the documents that were inserted before the last search for ω, but the corresponding documents were deleted since then. The Server deletes from the EMM[t ω ] the indices I 0 , and adds the indices I 1 .
Finally, the Server sends to the Client all the ciphertexts from CC that are associated with a label ind ∈ EMM[t ω ]. The Client decrypts the ciphertexts. A figure that shows the messages exchanged between the Client and Server can be found in the Appendix B.
Update. The algorithm takes as input the type of the update operation, i.e. op = 1 for addition and op = 0 for deletion, as well as, the type of data, i.e. type = 1 when a whole document is added/deleted and type = 0 when a set of pairs is added/deleted.
When type = 1, it takes as input Data, the operation op, the document index ind, and the document d (when a document is added). The added document is encrypted with SKE scheme and the ciphertext is sent to the Server. The Server stores the ciphertext in the ciphertext collection CC associated with ind. Otherwise, the Client sends only the ind, and the Server deletes the document's ciphertext from the CC.
When type = 0, the input is a set of (ind ||ω ||op) triplets. The Client prepares data blocks (ind ||ω ||op||pth), i.e. computes a tree path per triplet, and compiles the set B. Then, the Client interacts with the Server to store the data blocks using the SORAM algorithm.
The SORAM algorithm
In this section, we present our SORAM algorithm. Our algorithm follows closely the non-recursive (one level) Path-ORAM paradigm [38] . That is that, a full binary tree is used as the main data structure and each tree node is a bucket that can store up to ns data blocks. Each data block is associated with a tree path and it can be found in one of this path's nodes. The data blocks that are stored in the SORAM are of the form (ind ||ω ||op||pth), where (ind ||ω) is Figure 5 : The SORAM.setup algorithm the document/keyword pair, op is the operation and pth is the data block's tree path. All the nodes are stored encrypted using the SKE scheme and the secret key k SO . Practically, we are using a simplified and more efficient version of Path-ORAM that takes advantage of the design requirements of Mara. Two are the main differences between SORAM and Path-ORAM.
The first difference has to do with the computation of the data block's path. In the Path-ORAM algorithm, each time a data block is accessed, it is associated with a new randomly selected tree path and the Client must maintain a position map that stores the current paths. However, thanks to the read/write once restriction of Mara, the path in SORAM can be efficiently computed by a pseudorandom function and, thus, there is no need for a position map. A similar approach was used in [17] .
Also, Mara supports massive additions and deletions of data blocks. Thus, SORAM is designed to read and write data blocks in a batch, while Path-ORAM processes one data block at a time. Besides these two differences, the two algorithms are very alike and practically, SORAM can be seen as a simplified version of Path-ORAM.
SORAM supports three operations, setup, insert and delete. It also uses three auxiliary algorithms. Namely, the Evict algorithm that computes new tree nodes from a set of data blocks, the ComPath algorithm that computes the path of a document/keyword pair and the DelRedund algorithm that removes redundant data blocks from a data blocks set.
Finally, the Client has a local stash lS to store data blocks that cannot be inserted in the tree, similarly to Path-ORAM.
Main operations.
Setup. The setup operation initializes the full binary tree BT of height h = ⌈log 2 N ⌉ and computes a random key k SO of length λ. Each tree node is a bucket of capacity ns data blocks.
Insert blocks. The insert algorithm takes a set B of data blocks as input and stores them in the binary tree BT of the SORAM structure. It also moves any block that may reside in the stash to the tree. The Client requests from the Server n b = |B| randomly selected tree paths of BT and the Server sends the unique nodes of the selected paths. Then, the Client uses the Evict algorithm to prepare new tree nodes using the data blocks that already are in the nodes as well as the set S. Finally, the Server stores the new nodes in the tree by replacing the old ones. The local stash lS is used to store the data blocks that cannot be stored in the nodes.
SORAM.insert(B) algorithm
Client side [1] , i.e. the number of the data blocks associated with ω that are currently in the tree BT . Also, the Clients sends the token t ω , a pseudonym of ω.
The Server uses the token and the ComPath algorithm to compute c upd tree paths and sends all the unique nodes {N (i, j) } (i, j)∈J from the paths and their indices J to the Client.
The Client decrypts all these nodes and compiles the set S of all the revealed data blocks (ind ′ ||ω ′ ||op ′ ||pth ′ ) (no dummy blocks) and the data blocks from the stash memory (if any). Then, it clears out the set by applying the operation DelRedund. At the end of this operation, there is at most one data block per pair (ind ′ , ω ′ ) . Then, the Client extracts the subset I of all the data blocks associated with ω.
The Client uses the Evict algorithm and the remaining data blocks to recompute the nodes {N (i, j) } (i, j)∈J and stores back in the stash the blocks that cannot be inserted in the nodes. The Client sends all these news nodes to the Server and the Server stores them back in the tree. The algorithm returns I. 
Auxiliary algorithms.
The DelRedund algorithm. This algorithm takes a set of data blocks (a||b ||op||pth), and deletes among them the ones that share the same values (a||b) and have different value op, i.e. when both (a||b ||1||pth) and (a||b ||0||pth ′ ) appear, they are deleted. The number of deleted blocks is replaced by dummy blocks. Thus, the input and output sets have the same cardinality.
The ComPath algorithm. This algorithm takes as input a keyword's ω token k (ω) , and a counter and outputs the new path.
The Evict algorithm. The Evict algorithm takes as input a set S of data blocks (ind ||ω ||op||pth), a set of tree node indices J and the SKE secret key k SO . Starting from the nodes that are closer to the leafs, the algorithm fills in the nodes with ns data blocks. A data block can be stored in a node N (i, j) , if this node belongs in the data block's path, i.e. the i-th level node of the path pth has index j. The nodes are filled in with dummy data blocks, when they have less than ns entries. All the nodes are encrypted with the SKE scheme and the key k SO .
DelRedund(S) algorithm
(1)Ŝ ← ∅ (2) Initialize dictionaryD, of size |S|, with zeros
S ← S ∪ (id ||ω ||op||pth) (6) Fill in S with |Ŝ| − |S| dummy blocks (7) Output S The function P(pth, i) returns from the path pth the index of the node at level i. For instance, the path pth = (0, 1, 0) of a tree of height h = 3, returns, P(pth, 0) = 0, P(pth, 1) = 0, P(pth, 2) = 1 and P(pth, 3) = 2.
Finally, the algorithm returns the new nodes and set S of the data blocks that may have remained.
Security
The security of Mara strongly builds on the fact that the Server sees only random memory accesses. We assume that the Server is honest-but-curious, i.e. all the algorithms are executed properly.
Session: Privacy
CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom During initialization, the Server learns the security level and the number of pairs. During updates of keyword pairs (type = 0), the Server learns the number n b of updated document/keyword pairs, but not the operation performed. It observes only a sequence of tree positions chosen by the Server. During document addition/deletion (type = 1), the type of operation (addition or deletion) is leaked and the document index ind. During searches, the Server learns only the number a (l ) ω of updates for ω, since the last query on ω, as well as the tree paths used for these updates. However, these memory locations will never be used again for the same entries. Note that the ciphertexts returned by the Server to the Client can leak the documents size. We assume that some kind of document padding is used to avoid the leakage, as discussed above.
From the leaked information, it is easy to see that Mara offers Type − I backward privacy. More formally, we have. Sim computes a random token tk of length λ and sends it with a (l ) ω to the Server. It receives the nodes from the Server, it decrypts and re-encrypts them and send them back to the Server. Also, from TimeDB(ω), Sim computes the set I 0 of document indices that were deleted since the last search for ω and the set I 1 of the documents that were added since the last search. Sim sends I 0 and I 1 to the Server.
SimU pdate(L U pdt (ω k )): For Mara, we have that
If type = 0, then Sim asks from the Server to send the unique nodes of n b randomly selected tree paths. Then, it refreshes the encryption and sends the encrypted nodes back. If type = 1 and op = 1, Sim encrypts a document populated all zeros equal to the padded document size. It encrypts the document and sends it with the index ind to the Server. If op = 0, just sends the ind.
Since the the encryption scheme used is semantically secure, the document indices are the same, the number of SORAM paths is known and the paths are either randomly chosen by the Server or they are computed using pseudorandom function, the messages cannot be distinguished from the ones of the Real Σ A game. We assume that the pseudorandom function and the encryption scheme SKE are secure (the adversary's advantage is negligible).
Finally, following the Path ORAM analysis (Theorem 1, [38] ), for a stash size O(loдN ) · ω(1), the probability of a failure, i.e. that it exceeds the stash size, is negligible.
EVALUATION 4.1 Asymptotic Complexity
We compute only the overheads that the encrypted search index introduces. Thus, we do not include the storage, communication and computation cost of the documents. This cost is the minimum possible and linear to the size and number of the documents. Computation complexity. The Client encrypts and decrypts tree path nodes, removes redundant data blocks and reforms the tree nodes. When searching for ω, the Client processes O(a (l ) ω log N ) data blocks and when EDB is updated, the Client processes one tree path per added/deleted pair, i.e. O(log N ) data blocks.
The Server mainly stores and retrieves tree nodes. When a keyword query is performed, O(a (l ) ω ) indices are added and deleted from the corresponding entry of the encrypted multi-map.
Comparison with the other DSSE schemes. We compare our scheme with the other DSSE schemes that are forward and backward private. For the comparison, we use all the DSSE schemes that follow our line of design and hide memory access pattern. We also consider the Mitra scheme as it offers the best performance from the existing schemes. The comparison appears in Table 2 .
Our scheme offers the highest level of backward privacy with smaller communication and update complexity than the other schemes.
Also, it needs constant number of roundtrips (at most four messages are exchanged in total). The only other scheme that requires a constant number of roundtrips, is Moneta. Moneta also achieves constant Client storage.However, this scheme uses TWORAM and it doesn't scale nicely. ω ) document indices per keyword. However, this is the worst case. Since, with every operation (update and search), some of the redundant blocks are deleted. In a way, we amortize, slowly, the cost of deletion.
The Mitra scheme also needs constant number of roundtrips and the computation and communication asymptotic complexity is better. However, the scheme offers Type − II backward privacy.
Experimental evaluation
We implemented our scheme using C/C++. We used H MAC with Blake2 to implement the keyed PRF and AES-128 in counter mode as the SKE scheme.
We implemented both the Client and the Server locally. Thus, our evaluation concentrated on the computational complexity. In our experiments, the size of the database ranges from 10 3 − 10 7 and the number of documents from 10 − 10 5 . The number of keywords |W| is set equal to N /100. The scheme is initialized with randomly selected pairs. For our experiments we used a intel Xeon E5-2680, 2,7GHz processor, with 16GB RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and SSD hard disk.
For the design parameters of the binary tree of SORAM, we follow Path-Oram. In [38] , the size of the stash LM S and the size of bucket ns as a number of data blocks is investigated both theoretically and experimentally. Their relation as a function of the security parameter λ appears in 3. We used ns = 4 in our experiments and it was sufficient. We have monitored the stash memory usage and most of the time is was empty after the execution of an operation. [38] , the size of the stash (number of data blocks) as a function of the security parameter λ and the size ns of the tre node bucket (number of data blocks).
Bucket
Search. By design, in our scheme there is a shift of information from the SORAM data structure, and more precisely from the binary tree, to the encrypted multi-map EMM. After each query on ω the indices DB(ω) are stored in EMM[ω] and are retrieved from there, the next time we search for ω.
Clearly, the sequence of operations influences the efficiency of the schemes. Since, EMM is much more efficient than SORAM, the more often a search query is performed, the more efficient the search operation is. We test two different operation sequences with Mara.
The first case is a sequence of new searches only, i.e. the same keyword is never searched twice. In the second sequence of search operations we include only a set of keyword searches that keep repeating. The results appear in Figures 11 and 12 . As expected, in the second use case, the scheme is much more efficient. In a real world scenario, there is a combination of the two cases. Depending on the ratio of the number of new searches to the number of repeated searches the search time will be determined. If the number of updates is small, it is expected, that after a while the search queries will repeat very often.
Update. Figure 13 shows the update time when only updates are performed. We study the update time as a function of the update batch size. The new pairs are randomly selected. We can see from the analysis that this batch approach improves the computation complexity, as the same node may be processed once for more than one new data blocks.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a new DSSE scheme that is forward and backward private. Our scheme is the first one that achieves this level of security with a constant and small number of communication roundtrips. We evaluated its performance and we showed that it is practical. Figure 11 : Time computation as a function of the search size |DB(ω)|, when |DB| = 10 6 . The green line with the triangles corresponds to a sequence of new keyword searches. The red line corersponds to a sequence of keyword searches for keywords that have been searched before. Figure 12 : Time computation as a function of|DB|. The size of the query reply is constant |DB(ω)| = 10 3 . The green line with the triangles corresponds to a sequence of new keyword searches. The red line corersponds to a sequence of keyword searches for keywords that have been searched before. 
